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Marcus Dillender
Potential Effects of the 
Affordable Care Act on 
Workers’ Compensation
This article draws from the author’s chapter in The 
Economics of Health (Donald J. Meyer, ed.), which 
was just published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 
for more information.
The passage of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) represents one of the largest 
overhauls to the U.S. health care system 
since the introduction of Medicare and 
Medicaid. Among the reform’s many 
provisions are an employer mandate, 
an individual mandate, an expansion 
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income 
people to purchase coverage, and the 
establishment of health insurance 
exchanges. The ACA also reforms the 
individual market and implements many 
measures aimed at reducing medical 
costs. Despite its many changes to the 
health care system, the ACA largely 
ignores workers’ compensation insurance, 
which also deals with medical issues and 
has an overlapping agenda with health 
insurance. Although the ACA does not 
address workers’ compensation, it could 
have potentially major spillover effects 
on these state-level programs. This 
article considers the possible interactions 
between workers’ compensation 
insurance and the ACA. 
Workers’ Compensation overvieW
Workers’ compensation insurance 
pays all medical bills for individuals 
with work-related injuries and diseases. 
Because workers’ compensation is a 
state-level program, each state’s is a 
little different. In some states, private 
insurance companies administer workers’ 
compensation, while in others, the states 
are the sole providers of insurance. For 
workers who miss more than 3–7 days 
of work, workers’ compensation also 
replaces lost wages through indemnity 
benefits. The injured workers’ weekly 
benefits are a function of their weekly 
earnings and are subject to state-level 
maximums. In all states except Texas 
and Oklahoma, workers’ compensation 
insurance is mandatory for employers. 
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers 
were covered by workers’ compensation 
insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno 
2013). Employers paid over $77 billion 
for coverage, and workers received 
over $60 billion from the system. The 
majority of workers’ compensation 
cases—around 76 percent—are medical-
only cases and do not involve payments 
for missed work. Figure 1 shows 
workers’ compensation spending on 
medical and wage replacement over 
time. Spending for wage replacement 
has been falling since the early 1990s, 
while medical spending has continued 
to rise. The share of medical benefits as 
a percentage of the total benefits paid 
for workers’ compensation rose from 
around 30 percent in the early 1980s to 
approximately 50 percent in 2011. 
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the aCa’s potential effeCt on 
Workers’ Compensation 
Filing Claims
The ACA can affect claiming in a 
variety of ways. As discussed later, it 
can change the labor force composition 
and affect the number of people who 
have work-related injuries, but it can 
also affect who files for workers’ 
compensation. People without health 
insurance theoretically have an increased 
incentive to claim that their medical 
issues are work related even if they 
are not so that workers’ compensation 
will pay the bills. Thus, having health 
insurance may lower the incidence 
of people misclassifying non-work-
related injuries. But even if an injury 
occurs at work, health insurance may 
still deter workers from filing a claim 
if they prefer not to file for workers’ 
compensation. If this theoretical 
relationship between health insurance and 
workers’ compensation claiming holds in 
practice, the ACA will reduce workers’ 
compensation claims by expanding health 
insurance coverage.
Empirical research tends to support 
the notion that having health insurance 
coverage makes people less likely to 
file for workers’ compensation. Biddle 
and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan 
workers identified by physicians as 
likely having work-related injuries. Of 
these injured workers, only 30 percent 
filed for workers’ compensation. Of 
the 70 percent who did not file for 
workers’ compensation, 36 percent cited 
having health insurance as the reason. 
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of 
Massachusetts’s health insurance reform 
on workers’ compensation by projecting 
how many emergency room bills would 
have been paid for by the state’s workers’ 
compensation system in the absence 
of the 2006 reform based on 2005 
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the 
health care reform resulted in workers’ 
compensation paying for 5–10 percent 
fewer emergency room medical bills. 
 In Dillender (2015a), I compare 
workers in Texas just before and after 
they turn 26, the age at which young 
adults lose access to dependent coverage 
under the ACA. This approach yields 
estimates of the causal effect of health 
insurance on workers’ compensation 
filing. I find that immediately after people 
turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries 
with easy-to-delay reporting increase, 
while the overall amount of medical 
treatment that workers’ compensation 
pays for increases by 8 percent. Despite 
these increases, overall workers’ 
compensation medical costs do not rise 
dramatically for 26-year-olds because the 
majority of this increased care is for less 
expensive services. These results suggest 
that health insurance affects workers’ 
compensation filing, particularly at the 
intensive margin, but not necessarily for 
the types of services that drive medical 
costs. 
By influencing some people to file 
claims with health insurance instead of 
workers’ compensation, the ACA may 
result in cost savings to the workers’ 
compensation system. However, the ACA 
may also change the type of insurance 
plans people have by encouraging the 
use of more high-deductible plans 
because it institutes a 40 percent excise 
tax on health plans with individual 
premiums above $10,200 and family 
premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018 
(Zuckerman 2010). Since people will 
lack first-dollar coverage, they may be 
more likely to shift claims onto workers’ 
compensation, which will still provide 
first-dollar coverage.
Reimbursement Rates
One of the ACA’s measures aimed at 
reducing Medicare costs is establishing 
the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board (IPAB), which will make 
recommendations to cut Medicare 
costs if they grow larger than the per 
capita GDP plus one percentage point. 
If Congress fails to pass an alternative 
proposal with the same cost savings, the 
IPAB recommendations will become law. 
The IPAB curtailing Medicare costs by 
cutting reimbursement rates could affect 
workers’ compensation reimbursement 
rates since some workers’ compensation 
programs tie their workers’ compensation 
reimbursement rates to Medicare’s.
While this provision of the ACA may 
lower the amount of money workers’ 
compensation spends on medical 
care, it may also cause providers in 
these states to be less likely to accept 
workers’ compensation patients since 
they will receive less money for treating 
them. Even in states that do not tie 
their reimbursement rates to Medicare, 
changes in Medicare rates may affect 
workers’ compensation. Auerbach, 
Heaton, and Brantley (2014) argue that 
SOURCE: Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno (2013).
Figure 1 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Indemnity Benefits by Year
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when Medicare pays physicians less, it 
may cause physicians to increase prices 
for other payers or provide more services 
to other patients that provide higher 
margins. If Medicare no longer pays 
providers for certain readmissions, it 
may have the same effect if it decreases 
physicians’ profits from Medicare 
patients.
Labor Force Composition
 
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley 
(2014) also argue that the ACA could 
change the composition of the labor 
force. A large literature in economics 
finds that the need for health insurance 
has induced people to participate in 
the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and 
Simon 2013; Blau and Gilleskie 2001; 
Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012; 
Dillender 2015b; Nyce et al. 2013; 
Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA, 
there were few good health insurance 
options for the near elderly outside of 
employment. Auerbach, Heaton, and 
Brantley argue that the exchanges and 
subsidies will allow older people to retire 
sooner, which may reduce costs since 
older workers typically take longer to 
recover from injuries and require more 
treatment. 
Population Health
If the ACA improves people’s health, 
it may lower the likelihood that people 
suffer injuries while at work. The notion 
that health insurance improves health 
finds broad empirical suport (Card, 
Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle 
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find 
that people reported being in better health 
as a result of the Massachusetts reform. 
The ACA also has a focus on prevention 
by eliminating copayments for preventive 
services and including an annual wellness 
visit as a part of Medicare. 
Identifying More Efficient Treatment
By identifying effective treatments and 
digitizing medical records, the ACA has 
the potential to lower costs for medical 
care paid under workers’ compensation. 
An example of one of the ACA’s 
strategies to make medical treatment less 
expensive is the establishment of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research 
Institute, which focuses on identifying 
effective treatments. The ACA also 
implements rules that establish electronic 
health records, which could also reduce 
costs while improving care. 
Shared Medical Resources
 
A potential issue with the dramatic 
increase in insurance coverage promised 
by the ACA is that it will put more stress 
on existing medical resources. Hofer, 
Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point 
out that there was already a shortage of 
primary care doctors before the ACA and 
suggest that the increased demand from 
the ACA could increase the shortages. 
Huang and Finegold (2013) find that 
certain areas will be hit hard by an 
increase in demand. They estimate that 
7 million people live in areas where 
demand for primary care may exceed 
supply by 10 percent after the ACA. 
Physician shortages may increase wait 
times for injured workers before they can 
receive medical care.
ConClusion
By overhauling the health insurance 
system and making many broad changes 
to medical care, the ACA promises to 
change the health care landscape. This 
article describes the implications of 
the ACA for workers’ compensation 
insurance. It reviews the considerable 
evidence that points to a reduction in the 
claiming rate for workers’ compensation. 
The evidence also suggests that health 
insurance covers some of the costs that 
workers’ compensation insurance was 
previously paying.
Apart from affecting claiming 
behavior, the ACA will likely affect 
workers’ compensation insurance in 
other ways as well. The ACA’s many 
cost-saving measures—especially those 
that aim to identify the most effective 
treatments—will likely have spillover 
effects. The aspects of the ACA that aim 
to improve population health may also 
result in fewer work-related injuries, 
thereby saving workers’ compensation 
programs money. One negative aspect of 
the ACA for workers’ compensation is 
that the increase in insurance coverage 
may put more strain on medical 
resources, which could make seeing a 
doctor more difficult. 
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The Upjohn Institute announces the winners of the 2016 Early Career Research 
Awards. These grants are intended to provide resources for junior faculty 
(untenured and within six years of having earned a PhD) to carry out policy-
related research on labor market issues. 
•	 Mark Borgschulte, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign  
“Labor Market and Program Participation Impacts of Health and Productivity 
Shocks: Evidence from Forest Fire Smoke”  
•	 Kevin Callison, Grand Valley State University 
“The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Labor and Health Outcomes”
•	 Bo Cowgill, Columbia University 
“Labor Market Effects of Algorithmic Hiring: Evidence from Field and 
Natural Experiments”
•	 Jeff Denning, Brigham Young University 
“The Effects of Credit Constraints in College on Human Capital and  
Labor Supply”
•	 Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Duke University 
“The Impact of Labor Market Shocks on Household Financial Outcomes  
and Migration”
•	 Ina Ganguli, University of Massachusetts Amherst  
“Knowledge and Networking in Professional Labor Markets: Do Conferences 
Impact Scientific Careers?”
•	 Seth Gershenson, American University  
“Gender, Peer Advising, and College Success” 
•	 John Horton, New York University 
“The Effect of Demand Shocks on Human Capital Acquisition Strategies:  
The Case of Adobe Flash Workers” 
•	 L. Patten Mahler, Centre College  
“Examining the Labor Market Effects of Public Pension Design” 
•	 Ferran Elias Moreno, University of Copenhagen  
“Understanding the Labor Market Effects of Legalizing  
Undocumented Immigrants” 
•	 Samuel Kleiner, Cornell University 
“The Effects of Strikes on Hospital Production: Evidence from California” 
•	 Olga Malkova, University of Kentucky 
“The Effect of Pension Tax Reductions on Labor Supply”
•	 Mallory Vachon, Louisiana State University  
“The Temporary Migration Response to Industry-Specific Shocks: Evidence 
from the U.S. Shale Boom” 
2016 Early Career Research Award Winners
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Ian Fillmore
Price Discrimination and 
Public Policy in the U.S. 
College Market
Each year, over 80 percent of 
incoming college freshmen in the United 
States complete the Free Application 
for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). 
The FAFSA collects detailed financial 
information as well as a list of colleges 
where the student is considering 
attending. The government uses the 
FAFSA information to determine 
eligibility for federal aid, but because it 
lacks the logistical capacity to dispense 
aid on its own, it enlists colleges as 
partners in distributing federal dollars 
to college students. In the process, the 
colleges a student lists on her application 
receive full access to the student’s FAFSA 
information, including information 
about the student’s family income and 
the number of potential competitors the 
college is facing. This partnership of 
sharing FAFSA information with colleges 
has been treated as a mere administrative 
detail by students, parents, policymakers, 
and even economists. It is not. As I 
demonstrate, colleges use the FAFSA to 
engage in substantial price discrimination 
with widespread repercussions for the 
cost of a college education as well as 
the equilibrium sorting of students into 
colleges. 
Colleges in the United States charge 
high sticker prices but routinely offer 
discounts of varying sizes to their 
students, which means that students 
at the same college often pay vastly 
different prices for the same education. 
These discounts can be sizable and are 
intended to influence the student’s choice 
of which college to attend. For instance, 
if a college has a posted sticker price of 
$20,000 per year but it offers a student a 
$15,000 discount, the relevant transaction 
price is not $20,000 but $5,000. Each 
college offers a similar “price quote’’ to 
the student, and she chooses the college 
that makes her the most attractive 
offer, taking into account other college 
characteristics that she values in addition 
to price.1 
Colleges care about the FAFSA 
because it provides them with a source 
of low-cost, high-quality information 
about a student’s willingness-to-pay. 
The information is low-cost because the 
federal government bears the burden 
of collecting it, and it is high-quality 
because the government imposes fines or 
jail time for misreporting information on 
the FAFSA. Moreover, the application 
comes bundled with a convenient 
monitoring technology for ensuring that 
its information is reliable. Thirty percent 
of FAFSA forms are automatically 
audited using IRS tax data. If a student’s 
application is not randomly selected 
for audit, then that student’s college 
has full discretion to flag it for audit 
anyway. Indeed many colleges simply 
flag all of their students’ FAFSA forms.2 
Effectively, the FAFSA grants colleges 
generous access to the IRS and other 
government databases and allows them 
to use that information to learn about a 
student’s willingness-to-pay. 
Is sharing the FAFSA with colleges 
a good policy choice? Specifically, 
what would happen to prices, student-
college sorting, and welfare if colleges 
could not use it to price discriminate? 
To answer these questions I build and 
estimate a model of college pricing using 
student-level data from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study. 
I then use my estimates to simulate 
counterfactuals wherein colleges are 
unable to use the FAFSA to price 
discriminate and find that there would be 
four primary consequences.
First, with less ability to distinguish 
between low and high willingness-to-pay 
students, prices would vary less across 
students. I estimate that the variance 
in transaction prices among students at 
the same elite college would fall by 19 
percent.3 
Second, transaction prices at elite 
colleges would fall by $826 per student 
per year, and consequently student 
welfare would rise. However, the change 
in prices would vary by income so that 
students with parent adjusted gross 
income of about $37,000 would see no 
change in transaction price, those with 
higher incomes would see their prices 
fall, and those with lower incomes would 
actually see their prices rise.4 Looking at 
it differently, colleges use the FAFSA to 
price discriminate in a way that amounts 
to a 2 percent income tax coupled with 
a $723 rebate, so the lowest income 
students receive the rebate, but it is taxed 
away as income rises. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1, which plots average change 
in a student’s transaction price (relative 
to baseline) as a function of her parents’ 
adjusted gross income. Thus, colleges 
use the FAFSA to charge wealthier 
students more and poorer students less, 
effectively using higher-income students 
to subsidize lower-income students. 
Nevertheless, Table 1 demonstrates that 
colleges only redistribute 35 percent of 
the “tax revenue” they raise from using 
the FAFSA to other students in the form 
of lower prices; the remaining 65 percent 
accrues to the colleges in the form of 
higher tuition revenue. 
Colleges only redistribute 
35 percent of the “tax revenue” 
they raise from using the 
FAFSA to other students in 
the form of lower prices; the 
remaining 65 percent accrues 
to the colleges in the form of 
higher tuition revenue.
Colleges care about the 
FAFSA because it provides 
them with a source of low-cost, 
high-quality information about 
a student’s willingness-to-pay.
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The third consequence of preventing 
colleges from using the FAFSA to price 
discriminate is that 12.5 percent of 
students who are currently attending elite 
colleges would be inefficiently priced 
out of the elite market and would attend 
a nonelite college. This occurs because 
colleges are no longer able to tailor their 
prices as precisely. These mismatched 
students consist of a mixture of low-
income students and high-income, low-
ability students. 
Fourth, without direct information on 
income, colleges will use other student 
characteristics to engage in statistical 
discrimination, which will tend to 
reduce prices for minority students as 
well as curtail merit-based aid (since 
students with high test scores also tend 
to have higher incomes). These results 
all illustrate the extent to which giving 
colleges access to FAFSA information 
has affected the sorting of students into 
elite and nonelite colleges, the prices 
students pay, and the way those prices 
vary across different types of students.
In summary, the federal government 
has made a policy choice to share 
FAFSA information with colleges. This 
arrangement has been viewed as an 
administrative detail by students, parents, 
policymakers, and even economists. My 
FAFSA information restricted
Parent income
Number of 
colleges listed All FAFSA info
Bottom third ($) 212 −242 428
Middle third ($) −493 −361 −538
Top third ($) −1,908 −471 −2,312
Percent of “tax revenue” transferred 
to other students (%)
17.0 45.8 35.4
NOTE: When colleges can no longer use the FAFSA to price discriminate, some students see their prices rise, 
relative to baseline, while others see their prices fall. Each cell in the first three rows reports the average change 
in price for students in the corresponding tercile of the distribution of parent adjusted gross income. The final 
row reports the change in price for those who see their prices rise, divided by the change in price for those who 
see their prices fall. This measures the degree to which colleges use FAFSA information to price discriminate in 
a way that redistributes money from some students to others, versus simply boosting tuition revenues.
Table 1  Price Change Relative to Baseline by Income Group
Figure 1  Change in Price If FAFSA Information Is Restricted
NOTE: The fitted values plotted here come from regressing the estimated change in price relative 
to baseline on parent adjusted gross income (included as a fourth-order polynomial). No other 
covariates were included.
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results demonstrate that this seemingly 
unimportant administrative detail is 
actually an important policy lever that 
should be part of the current debate 
around redesigning our federal financial 
aid system. Taken as a whole, I find that 
although allowing colleges to use FAFSA 
information does increase efficiency 
somewhat and lower prices for some 
students, its main effect is to boost tuition 
revenue, primarily at the expense of 
middle- and high-income students.
Notes
1. Most high school seniors complete 
the FAFSA at the same time as their college 
applications. A primary reason for doing this 
is so they can compare price offers when 
choosing which college to attend. Research 
by van der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates 
that these discounts are indeed effective at 
attracting students.
2. It appears to be public knowledge that 
many colleges verify all of their FAFSA forms 
(Grant 2006; Weston 2014).
3. Elite colleges consist of four-year 
private colleges plus very selective public 
colleges (which roughly correspond to 
flagship state schools). Nonelite colleges then 
consist of less-selective and non-selective 
public colleges.
4. Roughly 30 percent of students at elite 
colleges have parent adjusted gross income 
below $36,886.
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New and Recent Books from Upjohn Press
Surviving Job Loss
Papermakers in
Maine and Minnesota
Kenneth A. Root and Rosemarie J. Park
Root and Park examine the plight 
of workers displaced from two paper 
mills and their paths to reemployment, 
retirement 
decisions, and the 
personal struggles 
they faced as a 
result of their 
dislocations. 
They provide 
insightful, 
personal portraits 
of workers that 
are representative 
of the hundreds who lost their jobs as 
a result of two mill closings—one in 
Sartell, Minnesota, and the other in 
Bucksport, Maine.
In addition, the authors describe the 
types of assistance that were offered 
to the workers displaced by the mill 
closings, dedicate a chapter each to 
the plights of female workers and of 
spouses who were both displaced by 
the closings, discuss the importance 
of community when economic 
displacement occurs, compare the 
experience of a mill closing in Canada 
with the Maine and Minnesota closings, 
and conclude with ways that society 
can be more proactive in assisting 
workers who suffer job displacement 
and the economic and psychological 
impacts that so often occur as a result.
Overall, this book adds a human 
perspective to the problems facing 
dislocated workers, not only in the 
shrinking paper industry but also in 
other contracting industries in the 
United States. 
251 pp. 2016
$19.99 paper 978-0-88099-507-8
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/
up_press/237/
NEW
Downloaded over 6,000 times!
From Preschool 
to Prosperity
The Economic Payoff to 
Early Childhood Education
Timothy J. Bartik
Bartik shows that investment in 
high-quality early childhood education 
has several long-
term benefits, 
including higher 
adult earnings 
for program 
participants.
“The 
economic benefits 
of investing in 
high-quality 
early childhood 
education are clear and backed by an 
impressive amount of research, as laid 
out in Tim Bartik’s book.” –Arthur J. 
Rolnick, former Senior Vice President 
and Director of Research, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
“This new book makes a 
comprehensive and compelling case for 
a strong public commitment to early 
childhood education.” –Nancy Folbre, 
Professor of Economics Emerita, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst
“Tim Bartik explains how early 
learning investment can strengthen 
the national economy and address 
economic inequality by increasing 
economic opportunity. Are there 
today any two economic topics more 
crucial than these?” –Robert Dugger, 
Managing Partner, Hanover Provident 
Capital
113 pp. 2015
$14.99 paper 978-0-88099-482-8
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/
up_press/228/ 
The Economics 
of Health
Donald J. Meyer, ed.
The choices we make concerning our 
health have consequences that are felt 
both personally and economy-wide. On 
the personal level, 
good health allows 
us to function 
freely, earn a living, 
interact with family, 
friends, and co-
workers, and to 
generally enjoy life. 
Each individual’s 
health-related 
decisions also play 
a role in the nation’s health care economy, 
which now represents some 17 percent 
of the nation’s GDP with projections 
that it will reach nearly 20 percent by 
2024. Therefore, policies and actions that 
encourage healthy living, along with a 
streamlined health care system, can have 
positive impacts on a large and growing 
portion of the nation’s economy.
In this timely collection, editor 
Donald J. Meyer leads a group of notable 
health economists who explore critical 
issues—and their economic impacts—
facing health care today. These include 
lifestyle choices and their health impacts, 
decisions on medical care and self-care, 
the fee-for-service payment model, 
disability and workers’ compensation 
insurance claims, long-term care, and 
how various aspects of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) impact the nation’s health care 
system.
Contributors include M. Kate Bundorf, 
Marcus Dillender, John H. Goddeeris, 
Donald J. Meyer, Edward C. Norton, and 
Charles E. Phelps.
155 pp. 2016
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-463-7
$15 paper 978-0-88099-462-0
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/
up_press/238/
NEW
ORDER FORM To order a publication or request a catalog, mail 
phone, fax or e-mail:
W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
Toll-free (888) 227-8569
Phone (269) 343-4330
Fax (269) 343-7310
E-mail: publications@upjohn.org
PAYMENT: All orders must include check, credit 
card information, or purchase order. Checks must 
be payable to the W.E. Upjohn Institute in U.S. 
funds drawn on a U.S. bank. All prices are subject 
to change without notice.
___ check enclosed
___ VISA
___ Mastercard
___ P. O. # ________________________
signature
credit card #
expiration date
phone
Book/Author Qty Cloth Qty Paper Total Price
Surviving Job Loss
 Root and Park  ___ @ $19.99 __________
The Economics of Health  ___ @ $40 ___ @ $15 __________
 Meyer, ed.
From Preschool to Prosperity   ___ @ $14.99 __________
 Bartik
           Subtotal $ __________
Shipping/Handling
 U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 first book, $2.00 each additional book.
 Elsewhere: $7.00 first book, $2.00 each additional book.                       Plus Shipping $ __________
   
         TOTAL $ ___________
SHIP TO:
Name Organization
Address                                  City              State          Zip
BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)
Name Organization
Address                                  City              State          Zip
April 2016
Nonprofit Org.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
Kalamazoo MI
Permit No. 756
W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
  for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
